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Abstract	
	
In	the	1960s,	the	concept	of	development	became	increasingly	intertwined	with	
conceptions	of	independence	amongst	Basotho.	Politicians	and	administrators	
before	and	after	independence	wanted	to	use	development	to	legitimize	their	
rule	and	consolidate	power	for	a	fairly	weak	central	government.	Their	inability	to	
procure	funding	for	large	projects	meant	that	they	were	forced	to	rely	on	smaller,	
self-help	projects.	These	small-scale	projects	became	the	primary	way	that	people	
in	Lesotho	interacted	with	their	first	independent	government,	which	indelibly	
shaped	how	people	conceived	of	independence.	These	projects	became	intensely	
politicized,	however,	as	government	leaders	relied	on	them	to	build	political	
support.	Basotho	in	youth	and	community	organizations	both	worked	with	
government-run	projects	and	created	their	own	small	projects	to	bring	about	
some	of	the	changes	they	hoped	to	see	from	independence.	The	coup	of	1970	
closed	down	many	of	the	spaces	that	had	opened	in	the	late	colonial	and	early	
independence	periods,	leaving	the	period	1966-1970	as	a	moment	where	the	
prospect	of	an	independent	Lesotho	bringing	about	development	seemed	most	
possible.	
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Self-Help	Development	Projects	and	Conceptions	of	Independence	in	Lesotho,	
1950s-1970s*	
	
	 Chaka	Ntsane	was	a	student-leader	in	the	Lesotho	Workcamps	Association	(LWA)	at	the	
University	of	Botswana,	Lesotho,	and	Swaziland	in	the	late	1960s.1	The	group	organized	projects	
where	high	school	and	university	students	went	to	communities	across	the	country	for	a	week	
to	construct	a	variety	of	small-scale	infrastructure	projects	that	fell	loosely	into	the	category	of	
self-help.	In	1968,	Ntsane	and	a	group	of	volunteers	went	to	the	village	of	Qomoqomong	in	the	
Quthing	District	to	erect	a	windmill	and	dig	pit	latrines.	In	a	second	week	they	went	to	Morija	in	
the	Maseru	District	where	they	constructed	a	school	classroom.2	Building	small-scale	
infrastructure	was	important	to	Ntsane	and	the	other	Basotho	student	participants	since	the	
members	of	the	LWA	were	“always	talking	about	the	future	of	the	country,	we	were	talking	
about	development,	talking	about	responsibility…[and	we]	began	to	say	that	we	needed	to	
contribute	to	the	situation	in	our	own	land.”3	This	linkage	of	infrastructure	and	development	
initiatives	to	independence	and	responsibility	was	common	among	Basotho	youth	in	the	late	
1960s,	as	many	internalized	the	connection	between	political	independence	and	economic	
development.	Voluntary	groups	like	the	LWA	allowed	youth	to	actively	participate	in	the	
building	of	the	new	state	of	Lesotho	through	small	self-help	projects.	Ntsane	found	the	work	
																																																								
*	I	thank	the	anonymous	readers	for	their	helpful	comments	and	suggestions	and	thank	Leslie	Hadfield	for	
suggesting	the	idea	of	convening	a	series	of	papers	on	the	history	of	development	from	the	bottom	up	at	the	
North	Eastern	Workshop	on	Southern	Africa.	A	previous	version	of	this	article	was	presented	at	the	African	Studies	
Association	Annual	Meeting	in	2015	in	San	Diego.	I	am	grateful	to	the	History	Department	at	SUNY	Cortland	and	
the	Residential	College	in	the	Arts	and	Humanities	(RCAH)	at	Michigan	State	University	for	providing	funding	for	
research	in	this	article.	
1	Basotho	refers	to	those	who	reside	in	Lesotho.	The	singular	is	Mosotho.	Lesotho	translates	as	the	land	of	the	
Basotho	and	the	article	will	follow	this	naming	convention	in	referring	to	the	land.	The	colonial	name	of	the	
territory	was	Basutoland,	and	will	only	be	used	when	directly	referencing	the	colonial	administration.	
2	“Voluntary	Service	in	Quthing,”	Moeletsi	oa	Basotho	(Mazenod),	36,	1686,	10	Aug	1968.	
3	Interview	Chaka	Ntsane,	Maseru,	24	Feb	2009.		
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important	because	he	felt	that	“if	we	didn’t	start	when	we	were	young,	we	would	have	to	do	
things	in	our	middle	age	that	we	should	have	done	in	our	youth.”4	
In	the	years	around	Lesotho’s	1966	independence,	the	number	and	type	of	self-help	
projects	grew	rapidly.	Basotho	youth	and	community	groups	like	the	LWA,	Boy	Scouts,	Girl	
Guides,	Student	Christian	Movement,	and	Homemakers	initiated	and	participated	in	a	variety	of	
small	development	projects.	These	complemented	government	efforts	that	also	used	the	
official	name	of	“self-help.”	In	these	programs	government	used	donated	food	aid	as	
“payment”	to	people	from	local	communities	for	their	labor	in	constructing	new	gravel	roads,	
village	water	supply	projects,	dams,	and	tree	planting,	among	others.5	With	no	large-scale	
development	projects	in	operation	in	Lesotho	during	the	first	years	of	independence	(1966-
1970),	these	projects	took	on	outsized	political	and	symbolic	importance	in	relation	to	the	
overall	amount	of	change	they	brought	to	the	country.6		
That	such	projects	were	generally	accepted	as	a	marker	of	independence,	and	contested	
in	a	manner	befitting	the	intensely	politicized	post-independence	period	in	Lesotho,	was	a	
testament	to	the	power	that	development	rhetoric	held	in	independence-era	Lesotho.	Colonial	
administrators	had	worked	hard	in	the	post-World	War	II	period	to	push	the	idea	of	
development,	and	Basotho	politicians	picked	up	this	theme,	proceeding	to	link	development	
with	nationalism	and	independence.	Through	this	confluence	Basotho	of	all	political	
persuasions	increasingly	came	to	see	political	independence	without	economic	development	as	
																																																								
4	Interview	Chaka	Ntsane,	Maseru,	24	Feb	2009.	
5	“Six-Month	Self	Help	Campaign	Starts	Soon,”	Lesotho	News	(Ladybrand),	25	Apr	1967.	
6	The	Thaba	Bosiu	Rural	Development	Project,	an	area-based	agriculture	project	jointly	funded	by	the	World	Bank’s	
International	Development	Association	(IDA)	and	the	United	States	Agency	for	International	Development	(USAID),	
was	the	first	large	development	project.	It	started	operation	in	1973	with	over	$8	million	in	external	funding.	
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an	incomplete	process	by	the	mid-1960s.	There	was	plenty	of	disagreement,	however,	on	how	
best	to	bring	about	either	development	or	independence.	These	disagreements	revolved	
around	competing	visions	for	what	role	development	should	play	in	shaping	the	balance	of	
power	in	newly	independent	Lesotho.	Leaders	of	the	ruling	Basotho	National	Party	(BNP),	
including	Prime	Minister	Leabua	Jonathan,	wanted	to	utilize	development	projects	to	centralize	
power	and	build	political	legitimacy,	while	opposition	figures	like	Basotho	Congress	Party	(BCP)	
leader	Ntsu	Mokhehle	hoped	to	undermine	the	BNP	government	by	urging	non-participation	in	
projects	and	denying	the	government	development	successes.7	At	the	grassroots,	the	Basotho	
population	largely	split	along	partisan	lines	on	the	question	of	whether	to	support	or	oppose	
particular	projects	because	of	the	heavy	politicization.	Still,	many	found	ways	in	the	early	years	
of	independence	to	participate	in	government-run	projects	or	to	be	a	part	of	projects	they	ran	
on	their	own	initiative	that	were	designed	to	bring	about	the	economic	changes	and	physical	
infrastructure	that	these	individuals	wanted	to	see	from	independence.			
Development	and	self-help,	thus,	were	at	the	center	of	debates	over	what	
independence	could	and	should	look	like	in	Lesotho.	Despite	its	political	importance,	there	was	
a	paucity	of	development	funding	in	Lesotho	from	the	late	1950s	to	the	early	1970s,	so	self-
help	and	other	grassroots	programs	with	similar	goals	and	practices	were	the	primary	ways	
through	which	individuals	and	the	government	enacted	development.	Ultimately,	after	1970	
the	Lesotho	government	started	to	garner	more	funding	from	abroad,	which	tilted	the	balance	
of	power	toward	development	as	a	force	for	centralization,	but	the	late	colonial	period	and	the	
																																																								
7	John	Aerni-Flessner,	“Development,	Politics,	and	the	Centralization	of	State	Power	in	Lesotho,	1960-75,”	Journal	
of	African	History	55,3	(2014),	401-21;	James	Ferguson,	The	Anti-Politics	Machine:	“Development,”	Depoliticization,	
and	Bureaucratic	Power	in	Lesotho	(New	York,	1990).	
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first	years	of	independence	opened	space	for	Basotho	in	youth	and	community	organizations	to	
formulate	and	work	for	visions	of	independence	through	development	efforts	that	brought	
about	small-scale	change	to	communities	across	the	country.	
	
Small-Scale	Development	Projects	and	Nationalist	Reimagining	of	Independence	
	 The	literature	on	the	history	of	development	in	Africa	has	rapidly	burgeoned	since	
pioneering	works	appeared	examining	how	the	idea	of	development	was	contested	and	has	
changed	over	time.8	Many	of	the	seminal	works	have	focused	on	large-scale,	high	modernist	
development	efforts	by	the	state	to	remake	and	reshape	societies	at	the	macro-scale.9	Much	of	
this	literature	has	also	focused	on	whether	development	projects	have	succeeded	at	fulfilling	
their	own	stated	aims,	or	on	how	state	projects	have	impacted	local	communities.10	With	the	
lens	trained	on	the	state,	development	agencies,	and	bureaucratic	processes,	however,	these	
studies	often	glossed	over	how	local	communities	and	individuals	experienced	and	understood	
the	changes	inherent	in	development.	This	was	rectified,	to	some	extent,	in	literature	on	South	
																																																								
8	Frederick	Cooper	and	Randall	Packard,	editors,	International	Development	and	the	Social	Sciences:	Essays	on	the	
History	and	Politics	of	Knowledge	(Berkeley,	1997);	Nick	Cullather,	“Research	Note:	Development?	It’s	History,”	
Diplomatic	History	24,	4	(2000),	641-653;	Monica	M.	Van	Beusekom,	Negotiating	Development:	African	Farmers	
and	Colonial	Experts	at	the	Office	du	Niger,	1920-1960	(Portsmouth,	2002).	
9	James	C.	Scott,	Seeing	Like	a	State:	How	Certain	Schemes	to	Improve	the	Human	Condition	Have	Failed	(New	
Haven,	1998);	Ferguson,	Anti-Politics	Machine;	Stephen	F.	Miescher,	“Building	the	City	of	the	Future:	Visions	and	
Experiences	of	Modernity	in	Ghana’s	Akosombo	Township,”	Journal	of	African	History	53,	3	(2012),	367-390.	
10	Andrew	Bowman,	“Mass	Production	or	Production	by	the	Masses?	Tractors,	Cooperatives,	and	the	Politics	of	
Rural	Development	in	Post-Independence	Zambia”	Journal	of	African	History	52,	2	(2011),	201-221;	Christophe	
Bonneuil,	“Penetrating	the	Natives:	Peanut	Breeding,	Peasants	and	the	Colonial	State	in	Senegal	(1900-1950)”	
Science,	Technology	and	Society	4,	2	(1999),	273-302;	Priya	Lal,	“Militants,	Mothers,	and	the	National	Family:	
Ujamaa,	Gender,	and	Rural	Development	in	Postcolonial	Tanzania”	Journal	of	African	History	51,	1	(2010),	1-20.	
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African	Betterment	Schemes	because	of	how	they	intertwined	with	protests	against	the	
apartheid	regime.11		
More	recent	work	examining	the	impact	of	the	TARZARA	railway	in	Tanzania	and	
Zambia,	and	the	building	of	the	Cahora	Bassa	Dam	in	Mozambique	have	started	to	examine	the	
intersection	of	top-down	stories	of	state	interventions	and	geopolitics	with	bottom-up	
perspectives	to	better	reconstruct	how	local	populations	understood	and	helped	shape	such	
projects.12	Similarly,	work	on	Tanzania	has	reframed	discussions	of	development	around	how	
rural	communities	helped	shape	Ujamaa,	looking	at	how	the	local	and	global	intersected	in	the	
lives	of	individuals	and	communities.13	This	reconceptualization	of	development	as	a	process	
that	needs	to	be	examined	on	the	local	level	in	as	much	detail	as	previous	studies	did	with	state	
planning	is	doing	important	work	in	foregrounding	the	experiences	and	understandings	of	rural	
Africans	with	the	state.	Most	people	in	Lesotho	and	around	the	continent,	however,	did	not	
interact	with	capital-intensive,	highly	centralized	projects.	Their	experiences	with	development,	
particularly	in	the	late	colonial	and	early	independence-eras,	were	with	smaller,	grassroots	
development	efforts	like	self-help.		
	 For	Lesotho	specifically,	development	literature	has	mainly	focused	on	the	massive	
Lesotho	Highlands	Water	Project,	and	on	soil	erosion	control	programs	and	integrated	area-																																																								
11	C.J.	De	Wet,	Moving	Together,	Drifting	Apart:	Betterment	Planning	and	Villagisation	in	a	South	African	Homeland	
(Johannesburg,	1995);	Jacob	Tropp,	“The	Contested	nature	of	colonial	landscapes:	historical	perspectives	on	
livestock	and	environments	in	the	Transkei”	Kronos	30	(2004),	118-137;	P.A.	McAllister,	“Resistance	to	
‘Betterment’	in	the	Transkei:	A	Case	Study	from	Willowvale	District,”	Journal	of	Southern	African	Studies	15,2	
(1989),	346-68.	
12	Jamie	Monson,	Africa’s	Freedom	Railway:	How	a	Chinese	Development	Project	Changed	Lives	and	Livelihoods	in	
Tanzania,	(Bloomington,	2009);	Allen	F.	Isaacman	and	Barbara	Isaacman,	Dams,	Displace,	and	the	Delusion	of	
Development:	Cahora	Bassa	and	Its	Legacies	in	Mozambique,	1965-2007	(Athens,	Ohio,	2013).		
13	Priya	Lal,	African	Socialism	in	Postcolonial	Tanzania:	Between	the	Village	and	the	World	(New	York,	2015);	
Leander	Schneider,	Government	of	Development:	Peasants	and	Politicians	in	Postcolonial	Tanzania	(Bloomington,	
2014).	
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based	agricultural	projects.14	This	article	moves	away	from	these	major	projects	to	examine	
how	Basotho	in	rural	communities	interacted	with,	helped	design	and	carry	out,	and	
internalized	the	messaging	of	development	on	a	much	smaller	scale.15	Epprecht’s	work	on	
Basotho	women’s	groups	operating	in	rural	areas	during	the	colonial	period	suggests	that	small-
scale	development	projects	and	self-help	efforts	were	accessible	to	and	desired	by	individuals	
in	rural	communities.16	Ferguson’s	work,	on	the	other	hand,	notes	that	from	the	mid-1970s	
development	in	Lesotho	was	increasingly	dominated	by	big-money	projects	that	not	only	gave	
local	people	little	input	into	how	projects	were	run,	but	effectively	removed	the	ability	of	local	
political	processes	to	change	these	projects	in	any	significant	way.17	This	article	not	only	fills	a	
chronological	gap	between	where	Epprecht	leaves	off	in	the	early	1960s	and	when	Ferguson	
picks	up	the	story	of	development	in	the	mid-1970s,	but	does	so	by	utilizing	the	strengths	of	
both	works	in	taking	a	bottom-up	approach	to	perceptions	of	independence	and	examining	
how	self-help	projects	within	development	became	integral	to	nationalist	reimagining	in	
Lesotho.		
	 Seeing	volunteer	labor	and	projects	run	by	youth	and	community	organizations	as	being	
performative	of	individual	and	group	nationalisms	is	key	to	recovering	a	deeper	understanding	
																																																								
14		Oscar	Mwangi,	“Hydropolitics,	Ecocide,	and	Human	Security	in	Lesotho:	A	Case	Study	of	the	Lesotho	Highlands	
Water	Project,”	Journal	of	Southern	African	Studies	33,	1	(2007),	3-17;	Mabusetsa	Lenka	Thamae	and	Lori	
Pottinger,	editors,	On	the	Wrong	Side	of	Development:	Lessons	Learned	from	the	Lesotho	Highlands	Water	Project	
(Maseru,	2006);	Femi	Akindele	and	Relebohile	Senyane,	The	Irony	of	the	“White	Gold”	(Maseru,	2004);	Kate	B.	
Showers,	Imperial	Gullies:	Soil	Erosion	and	Conservation	in	Lesotho	(Athens,	Ohio,	2005);	Ferguson,	Anti-Politics	
Machine.	
15	Nora	Kenworthy	does	similar	work,	but	in	a	contemporary	setting	with	regards	to	HIV/AIDS	programs.	
“Participation,	Decentralisation	and	Déjà	vu:	Remaking	Democracy	in	Response	to	AIDS?”	Global	Public	Health:	An	
International	Journal	for	Research,	Policy	and	Practice	9,	1-2	(2014),	25-42.	
16	Marc	Epprecht,	‘This	Matter	of	Women	is	Getting	Very	Bad’:	Gender,	Development	and	Politics	in	Colonial	
Lesotho	(Pietermaritzburg,	2000).	
17	Ferguson,	Anti-Politics	Machine.	
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of	popular	conceptions	of	development	and	nationalism	in	the	independence	era.	Kelly	Askew	
analyzed	similar	practices	to	unearth	popular	nationalisms	amongst	Tanzanian	dance	groups,	
whose	performances	were	part	of	independence-era	reimagining	of	the	state,	as	well	as	places	
for	local	people	to	claim	some	say	in	independence	as	“power…require[d]	performance.”18	
Similarly,	Marissa	Moorman	found	residents	of	Luanda’s	musseques	using	the	consumption	and	
performance	of	music	as	a	way	to	understand	and	work	for	particular	visions	of	a	national	
community	and	Straker	found	young	Guineans	in	community	theater	groups	“eager	to	pursue	
personal	and	collective	improvement	either	in	collaboration	with,	or	in	opposition	to,	national	
and	transnational	political	and	commercial	projects.”19		
The	practice	of	self-help	fell	firmly	within	a	number	of	already	existent	traditions	of	
public	efforts	that	played	dual	symbolic	and	practical	roles	within	Basotho	society.	Within	
Lesotho	there	was	a	long	tradition	of	the	public	performance	and	critique	of	power	through	
governmental	institutions	like	the	pitso	(public	meeting),	as	well	as	more-grassroots	practices	
like	lithoko	(praise	poems)	and	lifela	(spoken-word	poetry	of	migrants).	The	pitso,	in	its	most	
idealized	formulation	was	a	great	Basotho	democratic	institution	where	any	male	could	air	
opinions	and	grievances	“with	the	greatest	freedom	and	plainness	of	speech,”	and	the	chief	
must	“bear	the	most	cutting	remarks	without	a	frown.”20	Wallman,	however,	suggests	that	by	
the	1960s	the	pitso	was	more	a	“social,	rhetorical	and	political	exercise”	where	the	
																																																								
18	Kelly	Michelle	Askew,	Performing	the	Nation:	Swahili	Music	and	Cultural	Politics	in	Tanzania	(Chicago,	2002),	8.	
19	Marissa	Moorman,	Intonations:	A	Social	History	of	Music	and	Nation	in	Luanda,	Angola	from	1945	to	Recent	
Times	(Athens,	Ohio,	2008);	Jay	Straker,	“Youth,	Globalisation	and	Millennial	Reflection	in	a	Guinean	Forest	Town”	
Journal	of	Modern	African	Studies,	45,	2	(2007),	315-6.	
20	L.B.B.J.	Machobane,	Government	and	Change	in	Lesotho,	1800-1966:	A	Study	of	Political	Institutions	(New	York,	
1990),	23.	
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performance	of	power	was	more	important	than	the	democratic	spaces	it	supposedly	opened.21	
Chiefs	and	colonial	officials	often	called	pitsos	as	a	way	of	having	a	public	meeting	where	they	
could	disseminate	information	to	the	population	in	a	top-down	format.	Conversation	and	
consultation	were	undertaken	in	a	token	way,	if	at	all.	Lithoko,	commonly	constructed	in	honor	
of	chiefs	and,	in	the	twentieth	century,	politicians,	consisted	of	public	recitations	of	the	bravery,	
valor,	and	other	noble	qualities	of	rulers.22	In	broader	society,	praise	poems	and	lifela	were	well	
known,	and	provided	opportunities	for	people	to	perform	and	place	themselves	within	the	
context	of	“southern	African	forces,	structures,	processes,	and	events”	including	
independence.23	The	public	performance	of	politics	and	power	was,	thus,	well	known	and	an	
established	part	of	Basotho	society.		
	
Historical	Small-Scale	and	Self-Help	Development	Efforts	in	Colonial	Lesotho	
	 For	Lesotho,	the	1930s	saw	the	first	widespread	use	of	the	term	development	and	the	
first	projects	implemented	under	its	aegis.	The	Great	Depression	brought	about	a	crash	in	
commodity	prices,	which	threw	Lesotho’s	already	precarious	rural	economy	into	full-blown	
crisis.	This	was	magnified	by	a	particularly	harsh	drought	in	1932-33	that	killed	as	much	as	fifty	
percent	of	the	territory’s	livestock.24	In	response	the	colonial	government	hastily	convened	a	
panel	of	experts	to	analyze	the	territory’s	economy.	This	group,	led	by	Sir	Alan	Pim,	proposed	a	
series	of	deep	political	and	economic	reforms	designed,	in	theory,	to	assist	rural	farmers	and																																																									
21	Sandra	Wallman,	“Lesotho’s	Pitso:	Traditional	Meetings	in	a	Modern	Setting,”	Canadian	Journal	of	African	
Studies	2,2	(1968),	170.	
22	Z.D.	Mangoaela,	Lithoko	tsa	Marena	a	Basotho	(Morija,	Lesotho,	1975);	Mosebi	Damane	and	Peter	Sanders,	
Lithoko:	Sotho	Praise	Poems	(Oxford,	1974).	
23	David	Coplan,	In	the	Time	of	Cannibals:	The	Word	Music	of	South	Africa’s	Basotho	Migrants	(Chicago,	1994),	xvi.	
24	Showers,	Imperial	Gullies,	36.	
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increase	their	income.	In	reality	the	efforts	aimed	primarily	to	break	the	power	of	the	
chieftaincy	and	to	initiate	countrywide	anti-erosion	efforts	that	would	solidify	colonial	control	
over	rural	areas.		
The	package	of	“development”	that	Pim	put	forward	would	become	the	framework	for	
all	subsequent	development	efforts	through	the	1970s.	It	included	terracing	farmland	to	
combat	erosion,	constructing	and	upgrading	roads	and	bridle	paths,	expanding	the	health	care	
system,	building	big	reservoir	dams	in	the	mountains,	improving	breeding	stock,	setting	up	
wool	cooperatives,	and	increasing	the	number	of	agricultural	demonstrators.25	Embedded	in	
the	recommendations	was	the	high	modernist	assumption	that	Lesotho’s	economic	problems	
could	be	overcome	simply	and	quickly	by	educating	farmers	on	how	to	“properly”	farm	their	
own	land.	Pim	called	rural	Basotho	farmers	an	“ignorant	and	casual	population”	that	had	“no	
knowledge”	of	“modern”	agricultural	practices	or	how	to	combat	erosion.26	As	with	the	specific	
recommendations,	the	worldview	embedded	in	the	report	would	have	an	afterlife	in	
development	planning	and	implementation	into	the	1960s	and	1970s.	A	UNDP	consultant	
wrote	in	1966	that	rural	Basotho	had	a	“pathetic	contentment”	that	impeded	participation	in	
development	projects.27	These	types	of	mistaken	assumptions	misread	Basotho	grievances	with	
specific	projects	as	an	overall	aversion	to	the	idea	of	development.		
	 Rural	efforts	to	control	land	use	generated	the	most	pushback	from	Basotho	farmers.	
The	anti-erosion	efforts	set	up	after	the	Pim	Report	in	the	1930s	and	1940s	generated	a	lot	of	
																																																								
25	Financial	and	Economic	Position	of	Basutoland:	Report	of	the	Commission	Appointed	by	the	Secretary	of	State	for	
Dominion	Affairs,	Presented	by	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Dominion	Affairs	to	Parliament	by	Command	of	His	
Majesty	(London,	1935),	183-6.	
26	Pim	Report,	137.	
27	N.	Kaul,	Report	on	Local	Government	in	Basutoland	(Maseru,	1966),	22.	
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animosity	because	implementation	was	autocratic	and	did	not	allow	for	any	local	feedback	into	
how	the	project	operated.28	Basotho	generally	distrusted	colonially-run	programs	because	they	
did	not	trust	the	government	to	make	decisions	in	their	best	interests,	especially	ones	like	the	
soil	erosion	programs	that	seemed	like	thinly-veiled	efforts	to	allow	for	greater	South	African	
control	in	the	territory.	Suspicions	of	government	motivations	were	further	fostered	by	
concurrent	efforts	to	curb	the	power	of	the	chieftaincy,	as	Basotho	correctly	suspected	that	
interventions	in	rural	areas	were	designed	as	a	cloaked	colonial	power	grab.29	Finally,	rural	
resistance	to	the	project	also	came	from	the	fact	that	some	of	the	anti-erosion	works	did	not	
work	as	planned,	and	in	places	made	the	problem	of	soil	loss	worse.30		
	 The	1930s	also	saw	the	first	explicit	efforts	at	development	sponsored	by	organizations	
other	than	the	government.	The	Catholic	Church	was	the	primary	driver	of	these	efforts	as	a	
way	of	helping	their	members	survive	the	Great	Depression.	The	Church	had	previously	
invested	heavily	in	educational	efforts	throughout	rural	Lesotho,	but	under	the	leadership	of	
Quebecois	Canadian	priests,	they	also	organized	parishioners	in	volunteer	efforts	to	construct	
roads	and	irrigation	dams	in	their	communities,	to	teach	sewing	and	handicrafts,	and	to	set	up	
cooperatives	for	wool	marketing	and	the	purchasing	of	household	goods.	In	a	deeply	
impoverished	countryside,	Catholic	missions	stood	out	as	“hives	of	construction	and	relative,	
visible	prosperity.”31	The	range	of	programs	attempted	presaged	the	community	development	
efforts	of	the	1950s	and	the	self-help	programs	and	cooperatives	of	the	independence	era.																																																									
28	Motlatsi	Thabane,	“Aspects	of	Colonial	Economy	and	Society,	1868-1966,”	in	Neville	Pule	and	Motlatsi	Thabane,	
eds.,	Essays	on	Aspects	of	the	Political	Economy	of	Lesotho	1500-2000	(Roma,	Lesotho,	2002),	118-9.	
29	Colin	Murray	and	Peter	Sanders,	Medicine	Murder	in	Colonial	Lesotho:	The	Anatomy	of	a	Moral	Crisis	(Edinburgh,	
2005),	23-30.	
30	Showers,	Imperial	Gullies,	175.		
31	Marc	Epprecht,	“Gender	and	History	in	Southern	Africa:	A	Lesotho	Metanarrative,”	Canadian	Journal	of	African	
Studies	30,	2	(1996),	201.	
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They	proved	popular	with	rural	Catholics	because	they	provided	tangible,	material	benefits	to	
participants,	but	also	because	Catholic	lay	groups	had	extensive	control	over	how	projects	
operated.32	Basotho	women	constituted	the	majority	of	project	participants	because	so	many	
men	were	away	as	migrant	laborers	in	South	Africa.33	In	many	of	the	rural	areas,	the	small-scale	
development	efforts	of	the	Catholic	Church	laid	the	groundwork	for	the	widespread	acceptance	
of	the	idea	of	development	as	being	synonymous	with	independence.	These	programs	“brought	
direct	material	benefit	to	the	predominantly	female	rural	population”	and	“generated	new	
opportunities	for	women	to	assert	meaningful	autonomy	from	traditional	and	colonial	
structures	which	sought	to	inhibit	them.”34		
	 Colonial	administrators	noted	the	strong	support	from	Catholic	women	and	other	rural	
Basotho	for	development,	but	they	were	still	dismissive	of	these	populations	because	of	how	
they	wanted	development	to	play	a	key	role	in	centralizing	colonial	authority.	In	a	1959	
conference	of	the	district	commissioners	(DC)	that	focused	on	development,	an	unnamed	DC	
noted	that	conflicts	over	development	were	not	about	whether	Basotho	supported	the	idea,	
but	about	whether	they	were	willing	to	go	along	uncritically	with	government	development	
efforts:	“Basuto	(sic)	have	shown	an	ability	to	develop	in	certain	spheres	of	activity	but	not	
necessarily	in	those	spheres	in	which	Government	thought	it	should	develop.”35	The	DCs	
decided,	however,	to	ignore	their	own	insights	into	rural	Basotho	interest	in	development	in	
																																																								
32	Marc	Epprecht,	“Domesticity	and	Piety	in	Colonial	Lesotho:	The	Private	Politics	of	Basotho	Women’s	Pious	
Associations,”	Journal	of	Southern	African	Studies	19,	2	(1993),	202-224.	
33	John	E.	Bardill	and	James	H.	Cobbe,	Lesotho:	Dilemmas	of	Dependence	in	Southern	Africa	(Boulder,	Colorado,	
1985),	62;	Colin	Murray,	Families	Divided:	The	Impact	of	Migrant	Labour	in	Lesotho	(New	York,	1981).	
34	Epprecht,	Matter	of	Women,	188.	
35	Report	from	the	District	Commissioner	Conference,	1959,	DO	35/7384	Community	Development	in	the	HCT	
1957-60,	The	National	Archives	of	the	United	Kingdom	(hereafter	TNA).	
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favor	of	centralization.	They	wanted	“government	to	be	clear	on	what	sort	of	community	
should	develop,”	and	thus	dictate	the	types	of	projects	that	would	be	supported.36		
Dismissive	statements	about	rural	Basotho	attitudes	toward	development	did	not	end	
with	decolonization,	however,	as	Basotho	politicians	also	hoped	to	use	development	to	
centralize	political	authority	in	the	Maseru	administration.	What	changed	was	that	these	
attacks	targeted	specific	groups	of	Basotho	as	development	became	intensely	politicized	during	
the	independence	era.	BCP	leader	Ntsu	Mokhehle,	for	instance,	ridiculed	the	effective	small-
scale	development	work	of	women-run	organizations	like	the	Homemakers	Association	and	
Catholic	lay	associations	as	the	actions	of	a	“gaggle	of	geese	being	herded.”37	Mokhehle	
expressed	this	sentiment	in	the	context	of	attempting	to	argue	against	the	franchise	for	women	
in	the	pre-independence	elections	of	1965,	fearing	that	the	women	would	vote	overwhelmingly	
for	the	BNP,	which	was	aligned	with	the	Catholic	Church.38	Similarly,	BNP	Prime	Minister	
Jonathan	gave	a	bombastic	speech	in	Parliament	in	March	1968	where	he	accused	opposition	
supporters	of	non-participation	and	worse	in	the	development	efforts	of	the	government:	“This	
is	not	party-politics…this	is	a	situation	of	war…if	anyone	deliberately	ruins	our	soil	or	stands	by	
unconcerned	when	he	sees	the	deliberate	destruction	of	the	land,	I	have	only	one	word	for	
him…traitor.”39	These	rhetorical	assertions	of	Basotho	gullibility	and	intransigence	in	the	face	of	
development	tell	much	more	about	how	politicians	viewed	development	as	a	possible	force	for	
																																																								
36	Report	from	the	District	Commissioner	Conference,	1959,	DO	35/7384	Community	Development	in	the	HCT	
1957-60,	TNA.	
37	Mokhehle	quoted	in	Marc	Epprecht,	“Women’s	‘Conservatism’	and	the	Politics	of	Gender	in	Late	Colonial	
Lesotho,”	Journal	of	African	History	36,	1	(1995),	54.	
38	Epprecht,	“Politics	of	Gender,”	49-51.	
39	Speech	by	the	Honourable	Prime	Minister	of	Lesotho	Moving	the	1968/69	Development	Fund	Estimates	of	
Revenue	and	Expenditure	in	the	House	of	Assembly	on	Wednesday,	20th,	March,	1968	(Maseru,	1970)	11.	
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centralizing	authority	and	gaining	partisan	advantage	than	they	do	about	how	ordinary	Basotho	
viewed	and	reacted	to	development	projects.		
	 As	for	how	many	rural	Basotho	viewed	development	efforts,	the	case	of	James	J.	
Machobane	is	illuminative.	He	pioneered	an	intercropping	system	for	agriculture	that	helped	
Basotho	farmers	hedge	their	risk	against	bad	weather,	drought,	and	low	crop	prices.	
Machobane’s	system	attempted	to	solve	problems	of	food	insecurity,	soil	erosion,	and	a	lack	of	
employment	opportunities	by	intercropping	plants	that	provided	a	diverse	mix	of	
carbohydrates	and	proteins,	and	mixed	subsistence	crops	with	those	that	could	be	sold,	while	
never	leaving	soil	unplanted	and	exposed	to	erosion-causing	rains.	By	making	legumes	a	central	
component,	the	project	provided	a	protein-rich	food	that	also	acted	as	a	nitrogen-fixer	to	keep	
overtaxed	soils	healthy	and	productive.40	The	goal	of	the	program,	in	Machobane’s	words,	was	
to	make	the	system	simple	in	order	that	it	be	“so	self-regulating	that	the	general	necessities	of	
life	remain	in	the	development	and	intelligent	control	of	the	masses.”41	This	system	proved	
popular,	as	did	Machobane’s	agricultural	demonstration	school	that	he	set	up	in	his	home	
village	of	Nqechane,	which	he	called	“Mants’a	Tlala”	(stamp	out	hunger).	According	to	
Robertson,	the	college,	which	started	in	1957	with	twelve	students	learning	from	Machobane	
himself,	had	two	hundred	instructors	and	a	waiting	list	of	fifteen	thousand	by	1960.42	
The	success	of	Machobane’s	scheme	caused	both	the	colonial	regime	and	the	
independent	Lesotho	government	to	worry	that	he	was	building	an	independent	power	base																																																									
40	Letter	J.J.	Machobane	to	Venn,	Soil	Fertility	Officer,	Maseru	Experimental	Station,	May	10,	1957,	Agricultural	
General	and	Monthly	Reports,	January	1954-February	1957,	National	University	of	Lesotho	Archives	Leribe	
Collection	(hereafter	NULA	LC)	37/2	1936-1958.	
41	J.J.	Machobane,	The	Machobane	Mass	Agricultural	and	Development	Foundation	College:	Prospectus	(Nqechane,	
Lesotho,	1961),	1.	
42	A.F.	Robertson,	“Popular	Scientist:	James	Jacob	Machobane	and	‘Mantsa	Tlala’,”	African	Affairs	93,	370	(1994),	
108.	
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through	development.	What	had	been	curiosity	from	colonial	agricultural	officials	who	briefly	
supported	his	experiments	in	the	mid-1950s,	turned	into	increasing	hostility	toward	the	scheme	
and	the	college	by	the	1960s.	The	harassment	worsened	under	the	independent	regime,	which	
was	even	more	threatened	by	independent	power	bases	in	the	rural	areas	as	it	worked	to	
consolidate	governmental	control.	The	government	in	1965	closed	the	college,	and	Machobane	
fled	his	rural	homestead	in	1966.	He	spent	a	decade	living	in	semi-hiding	in	Maseru	because	he	
feared	for	his	personal	safety.43	Perhaps	the	ultimate	indignity	of	the	demise	of	Machobane’s	
teaching	system	was	when	Prime	Minister	Jonathan	co-opted	the	name	of	Machobane’s	
College,	Mants’a	Tlala,	as	the	name	of	the	portion	of	the	official	government	self-help	program	
that	subsidized	seeds	and	fertilizer	inputs	for	grain	mono-cropping.	This	co-optation	of	the	
name	signaled	that	top	BNP	officials	understood	how	this	popular	program	captured	the	rural	
imagination,	a	success	they	hoped	to	emulate	with	the	self-help	program.	Put	another	way	by	
his	biographer,	“the	agents	of	modernizing	states	are	anxious	to	monopolize	development	
transactions”	because	they	need	to	be	able	to	control	programs	run	with	donor	money,	but	
also	because	they	can	gain	political	legitimacy	through	project	patronage	in	the	form	of	direct	
employment	and	agricultural	inputs.44		
	 Contestations	over	development	highlighted	the	importance	the	colonial	and	
independent	Lesotho	governments	placed	in	the	idea	as	a	way	to	legitimize	their	own	rule.	
While	colonial	authorities	desired	large	projects	that	could	promise	mass	employment,	it	was	
clear	by	the	late	1950s	that	no	such	projects	were	immanent	in	Lesotho.	Still,	there	was	a	
																																																								
43	J.J.	Machobane	and	Robert	Berold,	Drive	Out	Hunger:	The	Story	of	J.J.	Machobane	of	Lesotho	(Johannesburg,	
2005),	43-62,	70-3,	109-10.	
44	Robertson,	“Popular	Scientist,”	115.	
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mandate	from	London	to	increase	the	pace	and	scope	of	development	efforts	so	the	
administration	moved	to	implement	community	development	schemes.45	This	was	partly	a	
decision	taken	expediently	since	there	was	no	alternative,	but	it	was	also	part	of	the	political	
experimentation	then	taking	place	in	Lesotho	as	the	territory	moved	toward	self-rule.	The	first	
constitution	went	into	effect	in	1959	and	created	directly	elected	district	councils.	It	vested	
these	councils	with	the	power	to	run	the	same	package	of	local	development	initiatives	the	Pim	
Report	recommended	in	the	1930s:	road	and	bridle	paths,	irrigation	dams,	and	other	similar	
small	projects.	Colonial	officials,	however,	never	fully	acceded	to	the	idea	of	Basotho	running	
their	own	affairs,	especially	in	the	realm	of	development.	This	hindered	the	ability	of	the	
councils	to	effectively	operate	such	programs.		
A	cooperative	tractor-plowing	venture	started	by	the	Mafeteng	District	Council	in	1961,	
called	FARMECH,	illustrates	the	resistance	from	the	colonial	government,	as	well	as	the	issues	
that	the	politicization	of	development	posed	for	development	projects.	The	scheme	should	
have	received	ready	support	from	the	central	government	because	its	goal	of	increasing	farm	
revenues	and	improving	agriculture	aligned	with	government	development	priorities,	but	it	
instead	met	with	resistance.	The	Department	of	Agriculture	warned	the	District	Council	that	
such	work	“should	not	be	undertaken	by	a	local	government	council”	because	it	was	the	
“prerogative”	of	the	Department.46	The	Council,	however,	noted	that	the	new	constitution	
																																																								
45	D.A.	Low	and	J.M.	Lonsdale,	“Introduction:	Towards	the	New	Order	1945-1963,”	in	D.A.	Low	and	J.M.	Smith,	
editors,	History	of	East	Africa,	Volume	III	(Oxford,	1976),	12-16.	
46	Sandra	Wallman,	Take	Out	Hunger:	Two	Case	Studies	of	Rural	Development	in	Basutoland	(London,	1969),	118.	
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made	them	“the	first	real	instrument	of	African	local	government”	and	they	wanted	to	move	
forward	with	the	project.47		
This	political	infighting	between	the	local	council	and	the	Department	of	Agriculture	was	
not	the	only	political	conflict	over	FARMECH.	Within	the	project	area,	people	described	the	
project	“as	a	Congress	[Party]	scheme	and	its	tractors	said	to	belong	to	Congress.”48	This	caused	
the	scheme	to	struggle	financially	because	it	could	not	convince	BNP	supporters	to	participate	
in	the	scheme,	so	the	project	failed	to	meets	its	revenue	projections	for	the	tractor-hire	service.	
BNP	supporters	worried	that	their	participation	would	be	read	as	support	for	the	BCP-
dominated	council.	Still,	despite	the	political	pressure	from	within	government	bureaucracy	and	
resistance	from	segments	of	the	population	living	within	the	project	area,	FARMECH	managed	
to	limp	into	the	mid-1960s,	despite	rapidly	losing	money.		
Acting	on	the	recommendation	of	the	Mafeteng	district	commissioner,	the	central	
government	agreed	in	1964	to	extend	more	loans	to	the	scheme,	primarily	because	“there	is	no	
doubt	that	the	scheme	itself	is	of	tremendous	agricultural	value	to	the	district.”49	This	was	not	a	
decision	made	without	controversy,	however,	as	the	Permanent	Secretary	for	Local	
Government	decried	the	scheme	for	“being	run	like	a	welfare	scheme”	where	the	charges	for	
tractor	use	did	not	“make	the	scheme	viable.”	He	argued	that	if	the	government	were	to	
support	FARMECH	with	more	cash,	the	program	would	have	to	be	reformed	to	“run	strictly	on	
																																																								
47	Wallman,	Take	Out	Hunger,	119.		
48	Wallman,	Take	Out	Hunger,	132.	
49	Letter	Permanent	Secretary	for	Local	Government	to	Government	Secretary	Maseru,	5	May	1964,	FCO	141-795	
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business	lines.”50	The	politicized	conflict	around	development	projects	like	FARMECH	served	to	
harden	the	desire	of	colonial	administrators	and	Basotho	politicians	at	independence	to	
centralize	control	of	development	so	they	would	not	face	as	many	messy	administrative	battles	
around	project	financing.	If	politicians	in	Maseru	had	to	pay	for	projects,	they	wanted	to	be	in	
control	of	the	schemes	from	the	start,	which	led	to	BNP	efforts	to	strip	the	District	Councils	of	
their	authority	over	development	projects,	a	plan	that	came	to	fruition	in	1968	when	they	
abolished	the	councils	altogether.	51	
	
Self-Help	in	the	Independence	Period	
	 By	the	mid-1960s,	development	projects	were	firmly	established	as	a	key	part	of	the	
political	process,	and	many	Basotho	saw	them	as	a	co-requisite	for	bringing	about	
independence	for	Lesotho.	The	Lesotho	government,	however,	was	unable	to	procure	
significant	amounts	of	foreign	assistance	for	development,	outside	of	food	aid	from	the	World	
Food	Programme	(WFP)	in	the	mid	to	late	1960s.	So	they	were	forced	to	rely	on	small	projects	
like	self-help	to	achieve	development	objectives.	These	financial	constraints	meant	that	official	
government	self-help	projects	usually	required	local	communities	to	contribute	with	volunteer	
labor	and	sometimes	a	financial	contribution	in	order	to	bring	projects	to	fruition.	Community	
and	youth	organizations	also	undertook	projects	that	could	be	classified	as	self-help,	sometimes	
in	conjunction	with	the	government,	while	at	other	times	running	such	projects	independently.	
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Thus,	self-help	became	an	established	part	of	the	national	political	fabric	and	a	key	component	
of	politics	and	national	imagining	by	the	late	1960s.		
	 The	BNP	government,	which	led	Lesotho	to	formal	independence	in	October	1966,	used	
self-help	projects	in	an	attempt	to	bolster	their	electoral	support.	They	had	only	won	the	1965	
pre-independence	elections	with	about	forty	percent	of	the	vote	in	a	three-way	race.52	Their	
electoral	promises	of	development	were	dependent	on	self-help	projects	because	of	the	lack	of	
foreign	funding	for	bigger	projects.	Setho	Letsie,	the	Minister	of	Works,	Posts	and	Telegraphs	
and	Communications,	announced	the	start	of	government-run	self-help	in	March	1966	during	a	
speech	where	he	argued	that	the	program	would	help	“transform”	food	aid	into	a	“capital	
asset”	to	allow	for	infrastructure	creation	and	improved	agricultural	productivity	on	the	
cheap.53	Minister	Letsie,	however,	implied	that	many	Basotho	were	not	ready	and	willing	to	
engage	with	government	development	programs,	as	he	argued	that	the	model	of	self-help	was	
necessary	to	ensure	that	people	“feel	that	the	projects	are	theirs	and	not	the	government’s.	In	
this	way	they	will	be	ready	to	maintain	works	initiated	by	themselves”	as	a	way	of	helping	bring	
about	a	“full	independence	and	growth	to	nationhood.”54	It	is	instructive	that	Minister	Letsie	
linked	the	development	initiatives	with	“full	independence,”	since,	as	will	be	seen	shortly,	this	
was	a	connection	that	most	Basotho	working	through	youth	and	community	organizations	had	
already	internalized.	It	suggests	that	BNP	officials	knew	they	had	to	work	hard	to	frame	the	
narrative	about	development	initiatives	in	such	a	way	that	political	credit	could	accrue	to	the	
government,	even	if	the	projects	had	little	to	no	connection	with	government	programs.				
																																																								
52	Richard	Weisfelder,	Political	Contention	in	Lesotho,	1952-1965	(Roma,	Lesotho,	1999).	
53	“Let	Us	Take	Along	the	Lamps	of	Wisdom,”	Lesotho	News,	March	18,	1966,	2.	
54	“Let	Us	Take	Along	the	Lamps	of	Wisdom,”	Lesotho	News,	March	18,	1966,	2.	
	 20	
	 The	self-help	programs	started	in	1966	consisted	of	two	separate	but	related	schemes	
to	bring	food,	water,	and	agricultural	assistance	to	villages	and	villagers.	One	was	the	food-for-
work	scheme	that	redistributed	food	aid	given	by	the	United	States’	government	and	the	WFP	
to	Basotho	who	worked	fifteen	days	a	month	on	road	and	school-building	projects.	This	was	the	
program	Minister	Letsie	referred	to	when	he	talked	about	transforming	food	aid	into	a	capital	
asset.	It	allowed	the	government	to	more	cheaply	construct	rural	infrastructure.	The	program	
utilized	Catholic	Relief	Services	to	coordinate	and	distribute	$3.4	million	worth	of	food	aid	from	
1965-1968,	and	it	continued	on	a	similar	scale	into	the	1970s.55	The	second	part	of	self-help	was	
assistance	to	farmers	for	purchasing	hybrid	seeds	and	fertilizers,	subsidizing	tractor	plowing	of	
fields,	and	constructing	village	water	supply	projects.		
These	projects	bolstered	the	services	available	in	villages,	and	they	relied	on	funding	
that	came	from	sources	like	the	United	States	Embassy’s	special	self-help	fund,	small	local	
contributions,	and	the	government	of	Lesotho,	whose	contribution	often	consisting	of	
transporting	materials	to	the	project	site.	In	village	water	projects	constructed	in	1968,	for	
instance,	local	communities	put	in	thousands	of	volunteer	labor	hours	on	each	project	and	
contributed	funds	that	averaged	around	ten	cents	per	person	in	the	community,	while	
contributions	from	the	American	embassy	and	the	Lesotho	government	averaged	around	$300	
each	per	project.56	These	projects	were,	in	developmental	terms,	tiny,	but	they	brought	a	safe,	
																																																								
55	Hugh	McCubbin	World	Food	Programme	to	A.	Howard,	US	Embassy	Maseru,	7	Aug	1968,	USAID,	Central	Subject	
Files,	1968-73,	Bureau	for	Africa/Office	for	Southern	Africa	Regional	Coordination,	Box	3,	Folder	PRM	3,	Regional	
Activities-Lesotho	FY	1969.	United	States	National	Archives,	College	Park,	MD	(hereafter	NACP).		
56	Special	Self-Help	Fund	Annual	Report	FY1969,	21	July	1969,	RG	286:	Agency	for	International	Development	P	907	
Central	Subject	Files,	1968-1973,	Bureau	for	Africa/Office	for	Southern	Africa	Regional	Coordination,	Box	5,	Folder:	
Assistance	Plans,	NACP				
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regular	water	supply	to	villages	through	a	communal	tap	where	previously	residents	had	to	
carry	water	by	hand.		
The	politicization	of	development	projects	was	overt	and	increasing	in	the	late	1960s.	
Having	the	Basotho	population	see	the	government	as	a	provider	of	significant	aid	from	abroad	
was	central	to	this	strategy.	Late	arriving	rains	in	1966	caused	the	BNP	government	to	request	a	
supplemental	supply	of	food	from	the	WFP	to	stave	off	a	potential	famine.	The	food	would	
have	gone	into	self-help	programs,	but	then	the	rains	arrived	just	in	time	to	allow	for	planting.	
Despite	this,	government	ministers	refused	to	reduce	their	requests.	A	British	official	noted	that	
Lesotho	ministers	were	“embarrassed”	by	the	promises	they	made	about	“outside	aid	and	are	
reluctant	to	reduce	demands	on	account	of	the	improved	situation.”57		
British	administrators	also	noted	the	nakedly	political	aims	of	the	government’s	
development	programs	in	February	1967	when	the	BNP	government	asked	Britain	to	frontload	
the	aid	for	development	that	it	promised	at	independence.	In	the	British	analysis,	this	request	
came	about	because	the	BNP	“government	must	show	as	early	as	possible	(and	definitely	
before	the	next	election	in	1970)	that	they	are	bringing	some	advantageous	results	to	the	
people	of	Lesotho	following	independence.”58	The	general	poverty	in	Lesotho	and	a	very	tight	
budget	meant	that	even	development—a	top	priority—lacked	much	funding	from	domestic	
sources.	For	instance,	the	Lesotho	government	in	February	1967	spent	R15,000,	or	less	than	
R2000	per	district,	on	self-help	agricultural	programs.59																																																											
57	British	Government	Representative,	Maseru,	to	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office,	8	March	1966,	FCO	141-976	
Famine	Relief,	TNA.	
58	Conversation	between	Prime	Minister	Jonathan	and	British	High	Commissioner,	Maseru,	9	Feb	1967,	FCO	141-
169	Post	Independence	Aid	to	Lesotho,	TNA	
59	Self-Help	Funds	by	District,	9	March	1967,	Parliamentary	Debates	of	the	National	Assembly,	Hansard,	Official	
Report,	3rd	February	1967	(Maseru,	1967).	
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The	BNP	government	was	never	under	the	illusion	that	the	limited	self-help	programs	
would	bring	widespread	development,	but	that	did	not	stop	them	from	making	lofty	claims	in	
an	effort	to	make	the	case	for	increased	centralization	of	government	powers.	To	do	this,	in	
1968	Prime	Minister	Jonathan	called	for	Basotho	to	redouble	their	efforts	at	self-help	and	“self-
reliance”	so	that	Basotho	could	realize	“greater	independence	in	[the]	running	[of]	our	state	
affairs.”60	This	lofty	rhetoric	was	mainly	for	public	consumption	as	behind	the	scenes	Jonathan’s	
advisors	showed	that	the	government’s	view	of	self-help	did	not	include	a	decentralized	vision	
where	Basotho	would	have	significant	inputs	into	how	projects	were	selected	or	run.	
Jonathan’s	economic	advisors,	South	African	professors	D.V.	Cowen	and	Owen	Horwood,	wrote	
in	1967	that	self-help	“should	not	be	haphazard…[it]	should	be	coordinated	into	a	proper	plan,	
District	by	District”	so	that	the	“electorate	can	see	something	actually	happening	on	the	
development	front	and	be	given	faith	in	their	own	country	and	its	Government.”61	This	memo	
neatly	encapsulates	the	dual	purposes	development,	and	in	particular,	self-help,	was	supposed	
to	play	for	the	BNP	government.	It	would	be	the	primary	vehicle	through	which	the	population	
saw	the	BNP	government	working	on	their	behalf	for	independence,	and	the	funding	for	the	
projects	coming	from	abroad	would	force	the	BNP	government	to	serve	as	the	centralized	
repository	for	funds,	thereby	increasing	its	power	at	the	expense	of	local	bodies.			
The	campaign	for	the	January	1970	elections	confirmed	the	central	role	that	self-help	
and	development	in	general	played	in	the	BNP’s	attempt	to	legitimize	and	popularize	their	rule.	
BNP	leaders	explicitly	linked	the	provisions	of	development	projects	to	constituencies	that																																																									
60	Speech	by	the	Honourable	Prime	Minister	of	Lesotho	Moving	the	1968/69	Development	Fund	Estimates	of	
Revenue	and	Expenditure	in	the	House	of	Assembly	on	Wednesday,	20th,	March	1968	(Maseru,	1968),	3.		
61	Letter	Cowen	and	Horwood	to	Anton	Rupert,	11	Jan	1967,	EAE	299	EA	4/3/2	Economic	Assistance	1967,	South	
African	National	Archives	(hereafter	SANA).	
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supported	the	government	in	the	campaign.	At	an	early	December	1969	stop	in	the	Berea	
village	of	Sebitia,	Jonathan	“pointed	at	several	completed	village	water	schemes	at	Peete’s	and	
Ntsoso’s	and	mentioned	those	under	construction	at	Mokabo’s	and	Nkutu’s”	and	noted	that	
the	government	would	“bring	further	development	to	the	constituencies	which	would	vote	it	
back	into	power”	at	the	elections.62	Notable	here	is	that	the	projects	Jonathan	mentioned	were	
exclusively	self-help	projects	that	required	community	inputs	of	labor	and	money,	so	he	was	
not	even	pointing	to	projects	that	improved	access	to	jobs,	but	rather	just	ones	where	
government	had	partnered	with	local	communities.	Additionally,	the	number	of	cabinet	
ministers	appearing	at	the	inauguration	of	self-help	projects	increased	markedly	as	elections	
drew	near,	and	the	amount	upon	which	this	was	reported	by	the	pro-government	newspaper	
Lesotho	News,	increased	in	tandem.63	This	all	suggests	that	the	BNP	government	understood	
only	too	well	that	its	electoral	fortunes	were	dependent	on	whether	Basotho	saw	self-help	
development	projects	as	successful	at	fulfilling	enough	of	their	ambitions	for	independence.	
	 Therefore,	it	was	not	surprising	that	the	opposition	focused	on	undercutting	the	
rhetoric	of	success	around	development	that	the	BNP	government	promulgated,	and	
undermining	projects	that	were	underway	in	the	early	independence	period.	In	Parliament,	
opposition	BCP	leaders	accused	the	government	of	running	thinly	disguised	patronage	efforts	
and	coercing	people	to	participate	in	self-help	programs	by	dint	of	threats	and	compulsion,	all	
under	the	rhetoric	of	nation-building	and	national	unity.	In	April	1967	Shakhane	Mokhehle	
																																																								
62	“Support	Me	or	Else…Jonathan”	Rand	Daily	Mail	(Johannesburg),	25	Oct	1969;	“Development	Will	Come	to	
Winning	Constituencies—Premier	Jonathan,”	Lesotho	News	(Ladybrand),	2	Dec	1969,	3.	
63	“St.	Rodrigue	Library	to	be	Opened	on	March	16th,”	Lesotho	News	(Ladybrand),	11	Mar	1969,	3;	“Water	Supply	
Scheme,”	Lesotho	News	(Ladybrand),	29	July	1969,	1;	“Letsie	Opens	Bokoro	Water	Supply	Scheme,”	Lesotho	News	
(Ladybrand),	19	Aug	1969,	1.	
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mocked	government	plans	to	attract	industry	to	Lesotho,	asking	if	the	industrial	jobs	would	pay	
people	similarly	to	self-help	programs	on	an	“in-kind	basis.”64	Similar	public	attacks	on	BNP	
development	efforts	would	continue	up	to	1970,	and	were	an	integral	part	of	BCP	efforts	to	
undermine	the	legitimacy	of	the	BNP	government.65	In	addition	to	speeches	in	Parliament,	the	
BCP	also	encouraged	passive	non-participation	in	some	government	development	efforts	and	
active	resistance	to	others.	In	1968,	for	instance,	opposition	supporters	tore	down	trees	
planted	as	part	of	National	Tree	Planting	Day	as	a	way	of	signaling	the	illegitimacy	of	the	
government	and	because	they	claimed	tree	distribution	was	politicized.66		
The	BCP	also	politicized	the	food-for-work	scheme	that	was	part	of	self-help	by	
encouraging	local	communities	not	to	participate	since	they	were	not	receiving	wages	in	cash.	
In	February	1967	opposition	Member	of	Parliament	Charles	Mofeli	railed	against	what	he	called	
discrimination	by	the	BNP	government	against	communities	in	his	constituency.	He	claimed	the	
government	had	“neglected”	them	since	they	had	built	miles	of	self-help	roads,	but	had	never	
been	made	part	of	the	national	self-help	program	despite	“national	funds	being	used	for	
various	public	interests	in	villages”	the	country	over.67	In	response,	a	government	MP	accused	
Mofeli	and	the	villagers	of	making	a	political	statement	by	going	it	alone	on	road	construction,	
and	then	expecting	government	to	fund	work	retroactively.	He	claimed	they	had	started	
building	before	receiving	permission	to	join	the	self-help	programs,	and	he	blamed	“certain	
persons	who	discourage	villagers	from	undertaking	road	construction	under	the	self-help																																																									
64	Mokhehle	quoted	17	April,	Parliamentary	Debates:	Official	Report	(Hansard)	(Maseru,	1967).	
65	W.J.A.	Macartney,	“Case	Study:	The	Lesotho	General	Election	of	1970,”	Government	and	Opposition	8,	4	(1973),	
480.		
66	Interview	Michael	Mateka,	Sacred	Heart	High	School,	26	Nov	2008.	
67	Mofeli	quoted,	Parliamentary	Debates	of	the	National	Assembly,	Hansard,	Official	Report,	3rd	February	1967	
(Maseru,	1967).	
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campaign,”	implying	that	the	BCP	was	advocating	for	policies	designed	to	consign	development	
projects	to	failure.68	In	this	sort	of	environment	it	was	hard	for	many	Basotho	to	keep	the	idea	
of	independence-through-development	alive,	as	political	connections	often	determined	who	
could	participate	in	or	benefit	from	development	projects.		
Outside	of	the	direct	glare	of	politics	there	were	sometimes	opportunities	for	Basotho	at	
the	grassroots	to	shape	projects	in	ways	that	more	directly	reflected	how	they	wanted	the	
benefits	of	development	to	accrue	more	broadly.	Village	cooperative	industries	(kopanos)	were	
designed	to	help	communities	start	income-generating	activities	in	rural	areas,	and	they	often	
had	roots	in	prior	Catholic	and	colonial	government	projects.	Cooperative	industries,	like	the	
one	in	the	village	of	Ha	Paki	at	Mazenod,	about	fifteen	kilometers	outside	of	Maseru,	typically	
set	up	weaving	ventures	or	other	small-scale	craft	production,	aimed	at	attracting	the	
burgeoning	tourist	market.	While	these	type	of	efforts	often	became	enmeshed	with	the	
intense	politicization	that	characterized	Mofeli’s	road-building	schemes,	this	end	was	not	
guaranteed,	as	the	relative	success	of	the	kopano	at	Ha	Paki	showed.	The	organization	there	
ran	weaving	and	spinning	operations,	with	many	of	the	local	villagers	supplying	wool	for	the	
project	and	working	as	spinners	and	carders.	Arriving	in	late	1967,	Peace	Corps	Volunteer	Ted	
Hochstadt	reported	that	the	kopano	operated	on	non-partisan	lines	with	BCP	and	BNP	party	
members	working	well	together.	This	was	surprising	because	Ha	Paki	was	certainly	no	rural	idyll	
immune	to	the	politicization	of	development,	as	Hochstadt	also	remembered	the	destruction	of	
trees	there,	planted	as	part	of	the	contested	National	Tree	Planting	Day	of	1968.69	
																																																								
68	MP	Api	quoted,	Hansard,	3rd	February	1967.	
69	Interview	Ted	Hochstadt,	email,	July	2012.		
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The	kopano,	for	a	time	at	least,	ended	up	with	a	different	result	because	there	was	a	
sincere	dedication	from	those	in	key	positions	of	the	organization	to	maintaining	structures	that	
operated	in	a	relatively	non-partisan	manner.	Hochstadt,	who	served	as	the	primary	financial	
manager	for	the	project	from	1967-69	and	as	an	advisor	in	the	weaving	shop,	thought	the	
kopano	succeeded	for	multiple	reasons.	“The	local	headman	was	the	president,”	and	he	was	a	
BNP	supporter,	while	the	weaving	managers	were	BCP	members	who	had	“good	relations	with	
BCP	supporters	in	Maseru.”	They	were,	however,	committed	to	hiring	“spinners	and	weavers	
without	regard	to	their	political	affiliation.”70	This	cooperation	in	management	across	political	
lines	ensured	that	the	kopano	surmounted	the	politicization	evident	in	other	projects	across	
the	country.	It	also	ensured	that	the	wealth	the	organization	created	was	spread	widely	across	
the	network	of	lowland	villages	that	helped	supply	the	material	and	labor	for	the	weaving	
operation.	This	commitment	to	widespread	prosperity	and	the	willingness	of	local	communities	
to	participate	on	a	broad	scale	suggests	that	particular	projects	could	overcome	the	
politicization	to	run	successfully,	both	from	an	economic	standpoint	as	well	as	in	the	eyes	of	
locals.	The	period	between	independence	in	1966	and	the	BNP	coup	of	1970	marked	an	
important	time	in	which	political	contestation	dominated	development	projects,	but	the	small-
scale	nature	of	most	of	the	projects	in	operation	and	the	inability	of	the	BNP	government	to	
centralize	authority	opened	up	spaces,	like	the	one	in	Ha	Paki,	for	Basotho	to	bring	forth	visions	
of	development	in	their	own	communities	that	differed	from	that	of	the	government.		
	
Conceptions	of	Self-Help	in	Youth	and	Community	Groups,	late	1950s-1970s	
																																																								
70	All	quotations	in	this	paragraph	from	interview	Ted	Hochstadt,	email,	July	2012.		
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	 Despite	the	broadly	politicized	nature	of	development	efforts	in	late	colonial	and	early	
independence	era	Lesotho,	a	broad	cross-section	of	Basotho	eagerly	participated	in	small-scale	
development	projects	in	the	hopes	of	realizing	some	of	their	visions	for	independence.	Many	of	
the	groups	in	which	Basotho	worked	for	their	own	visions	of	development	and	independence	
were	based	in	schools.	The	education	system	in	Lesotho	had	been	long	popular,	with	its	roots	in	
missionary	competition	for	adherents	from	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century.	
Lesotho	had	one	of	the	highest	literacy	rates	in	colonial	Africa,	with	at	least	sixty	percent	of	the	
population	having	basic	literacy	in	Sesotho	and/or	English	by	1950.71	The	three	main	Christian	
missions	built	and	operated	most	schools	in	the	territory,	receiving	a	government	subsidy	to	
help	pay	teacher	salaries.	In	the	1950s,	as	part	of	the	global	imperative	to	“develop”	the	
territories	of	the	empire	to	justify	keeping	them,	Britain	funded	a	rapid	expansion	of	secondary	
schooling	in	the	territory.72	Using	funds	from	the	Colonial	Development	and	Welfare	fund,	the	
expansion	increased	the	number	of	Basotho	students	in	secondary	schools	from	just	over	800	in	
1951	to	almost	12,000	by	1972.73		
These	new	and	expanded	schools	did	not	just	increase	the	number	of	seats	available,	
but	also	increased	the	number	and	variety	of	youth	organizations.	The	colonial	government	
encouraged	youth	groups	with	small	subsidies	that	helped	increase	the	number	of	chapters	of	
the	Boy	Scouts,	Girl	Guides,	Student	Christian	Movement,	and	Junior	Red	Cross,	among	others.	
They	also	funded	community-based	organizations	like	the	Young	Farmers	and	the	Homemakers																																																									
71	“The	Mission	Press	of	Basutoland,”	Basutoland	Witness	3,	4-5	(1949).		
72	For	more	on	late	colonial	development	initiatives	across	the	continent,	see	Joseph	Hodge,	Gerald	Hödl	&	
Martina	Kopf,	editors,	Developing	Africa:	Concepts	and	Practices	in	Twentieth-Century	Colonialism	(Manchester,	
2014).	
73	Annual	Report	by	the	Director	of	Education	for	the	Year	1951	(Maseru,	1951);	Annual	Report	of	the	Ministry	of	
Education	and	Culture,	1970/72	(Maseru,	1972).		
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Association,	in	the	hope	of	encouraging	development-oriented	thinking	amongst	Basotho	who	
were	not	currently	in	school.	Membership	in	all	these	types	of	groups	increased	precipitously.	
The	Scouts	and	Guides,	the	biggest	groups	in	the	territory,	mustered	about	2500	members	
combined	in	1951,	but	by	1967	the	first	National	Youth	Day	rally	handily	drew	10,000	young	
Basotho	from	all	groups	to	Maseru.74		
	 With	such	a	rapid	expansion	in	the	number	of	groups	and	participants,	adult	leadership	
was	often	stretched	thin	in	the	1960s.	This	allowed	young	Basotho	to	take	on	leadership	roles	
within	groups.	Gabriel	Tlaba	recalled	that	his	high	school	Scout	troop	was	“self-supporting”	
financially,	as	the	members	raised	funds	for	their	trips	and	projects.75	This	self-sufficiency	led	
those	like	Tlaba	who	ended	up	in	leadership	positions	within	the	troop	to	gain	experience	
making	decisions	and	figuring	out	how	to	carry	them	through.	Tlaba	noted	that	the	groups	were	
excellent	places	to	meet	a	wide	range	of	people	because	the	twice-yearly	scout	camps	meant	
he	had	“contact	with	all	the	schools	in	Lesotho.”76	While	they	did	the	outdoor	activities	and	
merit	badge	projects	common	to	Boy	Scouts	across	the	globe,	Tlaba	also	remembered	the	
Scouts	as	a	place	where	he	could	have	discussions	about	independence:	“That	[independence]	
was	talked	about	openly…at	the	Boy	Scouts	we	were	not	members	of	a	particular	party.	We	
challenged	them	all.	We	talked	about	them	all.”	The	fact	that	the	Scouts	had	a	diffuse	
leadership	structure	that	gave	a	lot	of	power	to	older	boys	in	leadership	positions	made	this	an	
organization	that	allowed	some	young	Basotho	to	have	free	and	open	discussions	about	politics	
in	the	run	up	to	and	immediately	following	independence.	This	was,	of	course,	no	utopian	
																																																								
74	“Youth	Rally	a	Success,”	Lesotho	Times	(Ladybrand)	21	Apr	1967.	
75	Interview	Gabriel	Tlaba,	Lesotho	College	of	Education,	7	Oct	2008.	
76	All	quotations	in	this	paragraph	from	interview	Gabriel	Tlaba,	Lesotho	College	of	Education,	28	Oct	2008.	
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environment,	as	Tlaba	himself	tacitly	admitted	when	he	said	that	all	the	parties	“rushed	to	get	
as	much	as	they	can	get	a	share	out	of	us,”	and	he	also	noted	that	many	of	the	elite	security	
forces	in	the	first	BNP	government	came	from	the	ranks	of	Catholic	Boy	Scout	troops.	However,	
the	point	made	by	Tlaba	who	was	a	Scout	until	he	finished	high	school	in	1966,	about	the	group	
being	a	site	where	young	Basotho	could	talk	about	and	experiment	with	ideas	of	community	
and	independence	remained	salient.		
For	many	young	Basotho,	their	vision	for	independence	revolved	around	the	idea	of	
being	able	to	find	decent	employment	in	Lesotho	without	having	to	resort	to	migrant	labor	that	
would	expose	them	to	the	full	horrors	of	the	apartheid	system.	No	doubt	the	allures	of	South	
African	employment	remained	for	many	young	Basotho,	as	South	African	cities	offered	
significant	cultural	and	social	opportunities	not	available	even	in	the	capital,	Maseru.77	Tlaba,	
training	to	be	a	priest,	did	not	have	to	worry	about	finding	a	job,	but	he	remembered	most	of	
his	peers	from	school	were	“looking	for	better	[opportunities].”	His	peers	who	stayed	in	school	
had	to	find	a	job	in	the	civil	service,	as	that	was	the	only	avenue	available	for	employment	in	
Lesotho	since	“there	was	no	industry	at	this	time.”78	It	was	not	just	Tlaba	who	reported	this	
either.	Mohlalefi	Moteane	also	graduated	in	1966,	but	from	the	Protestant	Peka	High	School.	
He	expressed	his	own	dream,	and	the	dreams	of	his	peers,	for	independence	as	having	more	
access	to	training	opportunities	abroad	so	that	they	could	be	“doctors	and	engineers”	who	
would	“come	back	[to	Lesotho]	and	run	their	own	affairs.”79	This	vision	of	independence	
																																																								
77	See,	for	instance,	Gary	Kynoch,	We	Are	Fighting	the	World:	A	History	of	the	Marashea	Gangs	in	South	Africa,	
1947-1999	(Athens,	Ohio,	2005);	Clive	Glaser,	Bo-Tsotsi:	The	Youth	Gangs	of	Soweto,	1935-1976	(Portsmouth,	
2000);	David	Coplan,	In	Township	Tonight!:	South	Africa’s	Black	City	Music	and	Theatre	(New	York,	1985).		
78	Interview	Gabriel	Tlaba,	Lesotho	College	of	Education,	28	Oct	2008.	
79	Interview	Mohlalefi	Moteane,	Maseru,	27	May	2009.	
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incorporated	individual	economic	opportunity,	but	it	was	also	rooted	in	the	language	of	nation	
and	community	with	participation	in	governance	as	a	key	component.			
	 Most	young	Basotho	were	not	going	abroad	for	training	like	Moteane	eventually	did,	
but	they	were	staying	and	working	within	their	own	communities	on	a	variety	of	projects.	
Young	Basotho,	in	some	cases,	explicitly	disavowed	any	connection	to	politics	or	independence,	
but	they	were	still	working	to	bring	about	changes	in	communities	congruent	with	the	broad	
vision	of	independence-through-development.	Armelina	Tsiki	was	a	Girl	Guide	at	St.	Rodrigue	
Secondary	School	where	she	was	working	toward	becoming	a	Catholic	nun.	The	Girl	Guides	
were	quite	active	in	the	community.	The	old	people	liked	them	“very	much…because	
sometimes	you	would	go	visit	them,	get	some	water	for	them	or	do	the	cleaning,	smear	the	
houses…even	sewing,	we	would	do	the	sewing	if	they	had	some	clothes	that	needed	repair.”80		
She	went	on	to	recount	how	they	knitted	winter	hats	for	community	members	and	even	helped	
at	times	“hoeing	in	the	fields.”	Unlike	Tlaba	and	the	Boy	Scouts,	these	Girl	Guides	did	not	
explicitly	discuss	politics.	In	part	this	was	likely	due	to	gendered	expectations	around	politics	
and	political	involvement,	but	it	was	more	than	just	that.	Tsiki	remembered	feeling	“a	very	
negative	attitude	toward	the	parties”	because	of	the	harsh	rhetoric	she	heard	about	in	the	
newspapers	and	from	word-of-mouth,	and	this	caused	her	to	not	like	“this	issue	of	politics	and	
independence.”	The	disavowal	of	political	interest,	however,	did	not	stop	Tsiki	and	the	St.	
Rodrigue	Girl	Guides	from	actions	that	were,	by	their	very	nature,	religious	and	political	at	the	
same	time.	
																																																								
80	All	quotations	in	this	paragraph	from	interview	Armelina	Tsiki,	St.	Rodrigue	High	School,	7	May	2009.	
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The	Girl	Guides	were	working	to	alleviate	the	most	pressing	material	and	social	needs	of	
local	residents,	and	they	were	helping	to	build	physically	and	metaphorically	more	sustainable,	
comfortable,	and	livable	communities.	This	larger	purpose	was	clear	when	Tsiki	noted	that	two	
of	the	biggest	draws	of	the	Guides	for	her	were	the	opportunities	to	learn	and	practice	
“leadership	skills,”	and	to	work	with	“girls	who	had	responsibility	and	at	the	same	time	who	
were	always	the	first	to	give	the	helping	hand	whenever	there	was	need.”81	As	an	aspiring	nun	
and	someone	who	would	work	her	way	up	to	eventually	be	the	principal	at	St.	Rodrigue	High	
School	for	over	a	decade,	Tsiki	was	laying	the	groundwork	for	the	kind	of	life	she	wanted	to	live	
in	independent	Lesotho.	Even	before	she	attended	secondary	school,	she	“had	that	desire	of	
joining”	the	sisterhood	to	serve	others	through	religious	devotion	and	dedication.	The	urge	to	
disavow	any	political	motivation	for	her	work	reflected	not	a	lack	of	desire	to	engage	with	ideas	
of	independence,	but	rather	a	rejection	of	the	idea	that	political	parties	represented	the	only	
vehicle	through	which	people	could	bring	about	changes	in	their	local	communities.	The	
development	projects	the	Guides	undertook	were	micro	in	scale,	but	they	were	still	
representative	of	how	these	young	Catholic	Basotho	wanted	the	new	Lesotho	to	operate.		
	 There	were	other	groups	that	disavowed	partisan	politics	in	Lesotho,	but	where	Basotho	
youth	were	also	engaging	with	political	ideas	and	the	idea	of	independence.	The	University	
Christian	Movement	(UCM)	and	Student	Christian	Movement	(SCM)	were	inter-denominational	
school-based	discussion	groups	that	brought	together	youth	to	discuss	contemporary	religious,	
social,	political,	and	economic	issues.	Simply	coming	together	across	denominational	lines	was,	
in	itself,	a	political	act	in	independence-era	Lesotho	where	the	Catholic	Church		
																																																								
81	All	quotations	in	this	paragraph	from	interview	Armelina	Tsiki,	St.	Rodrigue	High	School,	7	May	2009.	
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was	the	strongest	institutional	ally	of	the	ruling	BNP,	and	adherents	of	the	main	Protestant	
denominations	tended	to	support	the	opposition.82	The	Lesotho	chapter	of	the	UCM	was	based	
at	the	university	at	Roma,	but	most	chapters	of	the	UCM	were	based	in	South	Africa.	The	Black	
Consciousness	Movement,	in	part,	grew	out	of	South	African	chapters	and	continued	to	have	a	
close	relationship	with	the	UCM.	The	group	was	highly	decentralized,	but	the	Lesotho	UCM	
frequently	met	in	South	Africa	and	Lesotho	with	counterpart	chapters	from	South	African	
universities.83		
Even	for	SCM	chapters,	whose	members	did	not	leave	Lesotho	as	frequently,	the	
combination	of	faith	and	dialogue	on	political	issues	helped	clarify	for	young	Basotho	how	to	
blend	their	religious,	social,	and	political	interests.	At	an	Easter	retreat	in	1964,	seventy	SCM	
members	met	in	Morija	to	discuss	how	“independence	and	politics”	could	intersect	with	their	
desire	for	a	“deeper	understanding	of	their	Christian	faith.”84	The	expatriate	missionary	author	
of	the	report	damned	with	faint	praise	the	members	of	the	SCM,	as	she	did	not	conceal	her	
disappointment	that	they	blended	a	political	and	religious	emphasis	instead	of	being	solely	
focused	on	the	spiritual:	“There	was,	amongst	some	of	the	students	at	least,	a	very	real	desire	
to	have	a	deeper	understanding	of	their	Christian	faith.”85	By	drawing	a	sharp	contrast	between	
religion	and	politics,	the	missionary	showed	that	she	did	not	understand	how	young	Basotho	
understood	these	concepts.	Just	as	the	actions	of	Tsiki	and	the	Girl	Guides	were	fundamentally	
political	and	religious	at	the	same	time,	UCM	member	Gabriel	Tlaba	noted	that	there	was	
																																																								
82	Weisfelder,	Political	Contention,	65-7.	
83	For	more	on	the	UCM	and	Black	Consciousness,	Daniel	Magaziner,	The	Law	and	the	Prophets:	Black	
Consciousness	in	South	Africa,	1968-1977	(Athens,	Ohio,	2010).	
84	Ruth	Schoch,	“SCM	Easter	Conference,”	Basutoland	Witness	67	(1964),	14.	
85	Ruth	Schoch,	“SCM	Easter	Conference,”	Basutoland	Witness	67	(1964),	14.	
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certainly	no	dichotomy	between	religion	and	politics	in	the	minds	of	participants.	The	concepts	
were	so	intertwined	as	to	be	inseparable,	and	the	ability	to	freely	express	and	combine	their	
interests	in	religion,	political	action,	and	economics	was,	in	fact,	what	drew	most	Basotho	to	
these	groups.	According	to	Tlaba,	the	ability	of	the	groups	to	foster	a	sense	among	participants	
about	how	to	“live	our	Christian	lives	amongst	the	political	situation	and	struggles	that	we	were	
in	at	the	time”	was	their	strength.86		
School-based	groups	were	not	the	only	place	for	small-scale	projects,	the	building	and	
strengthening	of	community,	and	discussions	about	self-help	and	independence.	The	
Homemakers	Association	offered	an	important	space	for	these	types	of	activities	for	rural	
Basotho	women.	The	organization	in	Lesotho	dated	back	to	the	mid-1930s,	and	leader	Bernice	
Mohapeloa	noted	that	its	goals	were	to	help	members	“improve	the	homes”	and	“keep	alive	
indigenous	crafts	such	as	pottery,	grass	work	and	wall	decorations,”	but	it	was	primarily	a	
Christian	improvement	club	that	focused	on	raising	the	“social	standard	of	the	community	as	a	
whole	by	keeping	alive	the	interest	of	club	members	in	movements	of	progressive	
development.”87	According	to	Mohapeloa	by	the	early	1950s	there	were	over	160	chapters	
active	across	the	territory.	While	the	organization	had	its	roots	in	the	churches,	especially	the	
Protestant	missions,	by	the	1960s	many	chapters	were	acting	independently	of	churches	and	
also	participating	in	the	political	education	of	rural	Basotho.88	‘Maleseko	Kena	was	in	one	of	
these,	located	in	the	rural	Qacha’s	Nek	District	village	of	Tsoelike	Auplas.	The	mother	of	seven	
children	whose	husband	was	active	politically	and	often	gone,	Kena	farmed	and	sold	
																																																								
86	Interview	Gabriel	Tlaba,	Lesotho	College	of	Education,	28	Oct	2008.	
87	B.T.	Mohapeloa,	“Basutoland	Homemakers	Association,”	Basutoland	Witness	7,	1	(1953),	5.	
88	Marc	Epprecht,	“Domesticity	and	Piety,”	219.	
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agricultural	products,	made	dresses	that	she	sold	locally	and	through	the	post	to	South	Africa,	
and	owned	a	small	grain	mill.89		
For	all	that	she	could	and	did	do	on	her	own,	however,	it	was	membership	and	
participation	in	the	Homemakers	Association	that	made	her	eyes	light	up	when	asked	about	the	
independence	era.	Kena	recalled	that	the	group	in	Auplas	“had	power,”	but	this	was	not	based	
on	explicit	political	involvement	or	even	agreement.	It	was	a	power	that	came	from	being	
members	in	a	group	that	taught	solidarity	and	practical	skills.	Kena	recalled	learning	how	to	
“cook,	prepare	foods,	sew,	can	fruits	and	all	sorts	of	things,”	and	how	to	generally	“get	things	
done”	in	the	domestic	sphere,	but	also	in	terms	of	village	organizing.	Food	preservation	and	
sewing	were	tangible	development	projects	in	Tsoelike	Auplas,	as	they	were	in	most	places	in	
Lesotho,	because	of	the	absolute	poverty	of	households.	Subsistence	farming	and	mine	
remittances	undergirded	the	local	economy,	and	learning	how	to	stretch	household	budgets	by	
better	preserving	clothing	and	food	allowed	the	women	of	Auplas	to	utilize	more	of	their	scarce	
cash	to	keep	children	in	schools	and	invest	in	small-scale	economic	activities.90	The	
Homemakers	are,	perhaps,	best	thought	of	not	as	an	organization	of	domesticity,	but	as	a	
grassroots	cooperative.	What	they	lacked	in	terms	of	government	support,	they	made	up	for	by	
pooling	knowledge	and	resources	to	allow	Basotho	women	to	remake	their	community	through	
action	and	fellowship	in	a	resource-scarce	environment.		
																																																								
89	All	biographical	details	and	quotations	in	this	and	the	next	paragraph	from	interview	‘Maleseko	Kena,	Tsoelike	
Auplas,	17	Mar	2009.	
90	The	women	of	Auplas	were	just	as	divided	politically	as	any	other	place	in	Lesotho,	as	Kena	found	in	her	work	
with	South	African	political	refugees.	John	Aerni-Flessner,	“Homemakers,	Communists,	and	Refugees:	Smuggling	
Anti-Apartheid	Refugees	in	Rural	Lesotho	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,”	Wagadu:	A	Journal	of	Transnational	Women’s	
and	Gender	Studies	13	(2015):	183-209.	
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The	cooperative	focus	of	the	Homemakers	nicely	complemented	the	government’s	
focus	on	similar	structures	like	kopanos,	but	there	were	other	areas	of	overlap	between	
government	development	priorities	and	grassroots’	conceptions	of	independence.	
Infrastructure	creation	was	one	of	these	areas	as	many	young	Basotho	articulated	their	
independence	visions	in	terms	of	infrastructure.	Raphael	Leseli	expressed	his	dreams	for	
independence	as	seeing	“roads	and	schools…hospitals	and	clinics…development”	and	Motsapi	
Moorosi	wanted	“infrastructure,	the	roads,	farms,	agriculture,	you	name	it.”91	Meanwhile	the	
government	was	focusing	heavily	on	the	food-for-work	schemes	that	built	340	small	dams,	
helped	build	26	communal	irrigated	gardens,	constructed	400	miles	of	new	roads	in	the	
mountains,	800	miles	of	new	roads	in	the	lowlands,	and	improved	200	further	miles	of	
mountain	roads	by	1971.92		
Thus,	it	comes	as	little	surprise	that	Chaka	Ntsane’s	Lesotho	Workcamps	Association	
(LWA)—detailed	in	the	introduction—received	some	government	assistance	for	its	small	
infrastructure	creation	program.	Ntsane	was	more	explicit	about	linking	the	creation	of	clinics,	
schools,	and	windmills	to	a	vision	for	independence,	and	this	was,	in	part,	because	he	was	also	
in	the	BNP	Youth	Wing.	The	leadership	of	the	LWA	overlapped	to	a	considerable	degree	with	
those	in	government.93	The	funding	that	came	to	the	group	through	the	Department	of	
Community	Development,	which	was	part	of	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior,	came	about	because	
of	the	BNP	government’s	need	to	bring	any	and	all	development	projects	to	fruition.	For	Ntsane	
and	the	leaders	just	as	significant	in	terms	of	how	they	viewed	the	projects	was	the	fact	that	
																																																								
91	Interview	Raphael	Leseli,	Roma,	15	Jan	2009;	Interview	Motsapi	Moorosi,	Maseru	East,	12	Mar	2009.	
92	Department	of	Information,	Lesotho	1971	(Maseru,	1972).	
93	All	LWA	information	comes	from	interview	Chaka	Ntsane,	Maseru,	24	Feb	2009.	
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funds	also	came	from	the	United	States	Embassy	in	Maseru.	The	construction	of	infrastructure	
was	a	“contribution	to	the	situation	in	our	own	land,”	but	the	ability	to	“go	right	into	the	office	
[US	Embassy]…and	get	what	we	wanted”	in	terms	of	tools	and	financial	support	was	a	real	
revelation.94	It	symbolized	a	new	found	freedom	that	gave	Basotho	as	individuals	and	the	state	
the	ability	to	look	beyond	the	United	Kingdom	when	they	needed	to	garner	funds	for	projects,	
and	Ntsane	and	others	equated	that	with	independence.		
	 The	LWA	was	not	the	only	group	to	focus	on	infrastructure	or	to	work	in	conjunction	
with	government	development	efforts	as	a	way	of	bringing	about	changes	that	would	embody	
independence	in	local	communities.	Alexander	Sekoli,	a	Boy	Scout	troop	leader	at	St.	David’s	
Primary	School	in	the	Berea	district,	recounted	how	he	led	his	scouts	in	projects	that	ranged	
from	planting	trees,	to	helping	older	community	members	in	the	fields,	and	assisting	with	self-
help	village	water	supply	projects.	In	the	late	1960s	Sekoli	had	his	Scouts	assist	with	the	
transport	of	needed	supplies,	like	the	piping	for	water	supply	projects,	from	district	
headquarters.	These	projects	provided	service	opportunities	for	his	Scouts,	but	they	were	also	
meaningful	in	terms	of	raising	awareness	of	independence	in	local	villages.	Sekoli	saw	his	role	
as	“personally	going	around	telling	people”	about	the	projects,	and	acting	as	a	link	between	
government	administrators	at	the	district	headquarters	and	local	communities,	while	getting	
his	Scouts	to	perform	the	volunteer	labor	necessary	to	bring	the	projects	to	fruition.95		
While	Sekoli	was	a	Catholic	schoolteacher	who	supported	the	BNP	and	clearly	had	good	
connections	with	the	BNP	officials	at	district	headquarters	in	Teyateyaneng,	he	deliberately	and	
consciously	did	not	officially	join	the	party.	He	understood	the	politicization	of	development																																																									
94	Interview	Chaka	Ntsane,	Maseru,	24	Feb	2009.	
95	Interview	Alexander	Sekoli,	St.	David’s	Mission,	13	Nov	2008.	
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work	taking	place	and	while	he	was	“so	active	that	[BNP	leaders]	had	asked	me	to	join	the	party	
but	I	was	afraid	because	I	was	loved	by	all	the	parties,	BCP	and	BNP,	but	I	said	I	was	staying	out	
because	I	was	afraid	of	[offending].”96	This	commitment	to	keeping	politics	out	of	the	water	
supply	projects	was	partly	rooted	in	Boy	Scout	ideology,	specifically	the	Fourth	Scout	Law	that	
declared	Scouts	“brothers	to	every	other	Scout,”	but	also	his	own	views	that	independence	
should	involve	a	“widening	of	opportunities”	in	education	and	in	terms	of	services	available	in	
villages	like	the	piped	water.97	Had	he	joined	the	BNP,	his	troop	would	have	faced	more	
difficulties	assisting	with	water	projects	in	opposition-supporting	villages.			
	 While	Sekoli	might	have	been	able	to	keep	village	water	supply	projects	free	from	some	
of	the	worst	politicization	of	the	self-help	programs,	this	was	not	the	case	everywhere	in	the	
country.	Sekoli’s	inclination	to	stay	free	from	politics	was	prescient	as	partisanship	and	the	
perception	of	it	impeded	participation	in	self-help	projects.	American	Peace	Corps	Volunteer	
Tom	Carroll,	working	on	water	projects	in	the	Mafeteng	District	in	the	late	1960s,	reported	that	
“there	was	always	politics	involved	with	which	villages	got	picked”	and	that	the	first	projects	
completed	were	in	places	where	“the	chief	was	pretty	close	to	the	BNP	leadership	or	to	the	
King.”98	This	led	to	some	fairly	intense	skepticism	of	the	projects.	Similar	to	how	BNP	supporters	
resisted	the	FARMECH	project	in	Mafeteng	in	the	early	1960s	because	of	the	possibility	for	it	to	
reflect	well	on	the	BCP,	in	the	late	1960s	the	tables	were	reversed	and	it	was	BCP	supporters	
who	were	leery	of	buttressing	BNP	support	by	participating	in	the	water	projects.		
																																																								
96	Interview	Alexander	Sekoli,	St.	David’s	Mission,	13	Nov	2008.	
97	Timothy	Parsons,	Race,	Resistance,	and	the	Boy	Scout	Movement	in	British	Colonial	Africa	(Athens,	Ohio,	2004),	
6;	Interview	Alexander	Sekoli,	St.	David’s	Mission,	13	Nov	2008.	
98	Interview	Tom	Carroll,	phone,	30	July	2012.	
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Scott	Brumbaugh,	another	volunteer	who	worked	on	similar	projects	in	the	BCP-
supporting	Matelile	area,	noted	this	resistance	from	a	political	standpoint,	but	also	
characterized	the	people	he	met	in	villages	as	“curious	and	[they]	wanted	things	to	happen”	like	
the	water	projects.	He	was	not	able	to	convince	them	to	participate	in	the	projects,	however,	
until	he	met	a	local	schoolteacher	named	Benedict	Makoakoa	who	“had	a	passion	for	these	
projects”	and	who	would	serve	as	“spokesman/translator”	for	Brumbaugh.	Thus,	in	the	first	
four	months	on	the	job,	Brumbaugh	completed	just	one	project,	but	he	managed	to	help	
twenty-nine	other	villages	complete	projects	in	his	last	fifteen	months	on	the	job	with	the	
assistance	of	Makoakoa.99	This	vastly	increased	completion	rate	on	projects	suggests	a	strong	
support	for	the	outcomes	of	self-help	projects,	even	if	there	were	hesitations	based	on	the	
politicization	of	projects.		
	
Conclusion	
The	period	between	1966	and	January	1970,	when	the	BNP	government	suspended	the	
announcement	of	voting	tallies	from	a	countrywide	general	election	and	held	onto	power	
illegally	by	suspending	the	constitution,	marked	an	era	of	hope	and	optimism	in	Lesotho.	During	
this	short	period,	the	promises	of	independence	seemed	most	real	to	many	Basotho,	especially	
youth	who	had	spent	time	in	schools	and	organizations	talking	about	independence	and	
thinking	about	what	the	concept	might	mean	in	practice	for	their	lives	and	for	the	lives	of	those	
in	their	communities.	For	the	BNP	government,	it	was	a	frustrating	era	because	Prime	Minister	
Jonathan	and	the	Cabinet	had	ambitions	to	centralize	power	through	development,	but	they	
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were	not	able	to	do	so	because	of	the	limited	international	funding	they	had.	The	situation	of	
the	mid-1970s,	documented	by	Ferguson,	whereby	aid	and	development	projects	operated	on	
their	own	logic	to	solidify	the	power	of	international	institutions	and	the	central	government	at	
the	expense	of	local	input,	had	not	yet	arrived.100	Development	was	still	something	that	local	
people	could	hope	to	shape	in	ways	that	might	bring	about	changes	they	wanted	to	see	with	
independence,	and	they	participated	in	projects	that	helped	further	this	vision	with	eagerness	
and	an	earnestness	befitting	the	newness	of	the	concept	of	the	state	of	Lesotho.		
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